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Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Financial markets are important. They aggregate information, allocate capi-
tal, and allow for consumption smoothing and risk sharing. These functions
are instrumental to generating aﬄuence in society. Primary markets form a
distinct type of financial markets, that have a particular direct impact on real
economic activity. In this thesis, I show how the operation of primary equity
markets depends on market liquidity and stereotypes, and how the primary
market for contingent convertible bonds can generate adverse incentives that
have consequences for real economic activity.
To see the functions of financial markets in action, consider a company
issuing new shares on financial markets. The markets aggregate information
on demand for the shares of potential investors; the supply of and demand for
the shares together determine a price per share, which in turn determines how
much capital is allocated to the firm for investment. For investors, financial
markets offer the opportunity to smooth consumption by investing now, in
return for increased cash flow in the future. For the shareholders of the
company prior to the new issue, the financial markets allow them to share the
risk of new investment over a broader investor base.
Well functioning financial markets generate aﬄuence in society. They allo-
cate capital to firms for investment, in accordance with investors’ expectations
on the investment’s future cash flows. Firms with higher expected returns on
investment are given more capital than those with lower expected returns. For
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society as a whole, funds are allocated to maximize wealth growth. Further,
well functioning financial markets allow investors to smooth their consump-
tion by investing; and in a world of decreasing marginal utility, this generates
increased aﬄuence. Finally, by facilitating risk sharing, well functioning finan-
cial markets make high-risk investments feasible, enlarging the set of option
over which wealth growth can be maximized.
Primary markets form a distinct type of financial markets. On primary
markets, firms issue new securities to raise capital. Firms can subsequently
invest the resulting proceeds in real assets to further develop their business.
Activity on primary markets is interesting, as trades on these markets directly
affect capital flows to companies and impact the distribution of resources in
the economy. Moreover, trades also change the mix of security types, and
with that the set of incentives to which shareholders and management are
subject. These changes in incentives can impact decision making. Through
both channels, activity on primary markets can have real economic conse-
quences.
In this thesis, I zoom in on the functioning of these primary markets. I
show how the pricing of shares in initial public equity offerings is affected
by stereotypes about industries, how market liquidity affects equity issuance
activity, and how changed incentives due to the issuance of contingent con-
vertible bonds influence real economic choices in European banks. In the
remainder of this introduction, I discuss the role of these topics in the discus-
sion on the functioning of primary markets.
1.1 Pricing securities
If prices of securities do not reflect their true value, this can adversely affect
economic growth. Whether prices of securities reflect their true value, has
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attracted substantial research and debate over time. To help understand a
price deviation from fundamentals, human behavior needs to be modelled.
Chapter 2 contributes to this debate by highlighting the role of stereotypes
about industries in the pricing of new shares on the U.S. primary market.
A price of a security can be considered to reflect its true value, if it reflects
all available information regarding expected return and risk. In that case, the
market for that security is ‘efficient’ (Fama, 1970). If primary markets are
not efficient, prices do not reflect their true value, and economic growth is
not maximized. To see this, recall that the pricing of new securities directly
affects capital inflow. As a result of distorted prices, some firms raise more
cash than they should while others raise less. Capital flows disproportion-
ately to lower quality firms and investment projects. Overall, capital is not
allocated to maximize growth. Additionally, the risk-return trade-off deteri-
orates, deterring investors to shoulder risks. At the macro level, there is a
sub-optimal level of investment, resulting in lower economic growth. For ex-
isting shareholders looking to share risks, finding other shareholders becomes
more difficult.
Whether prices of securities equal their true value has attracted substan-
tial academic attention. Hayek (1945) argues that (financial) markets aggre-
gate relevant information more efficiently than any central planner could, and
produce prices that trump other considerations in the planning of investment
and future production. Fama (1970) refines this argument by distinguishing
different gradations of price efficiency, based on what information is incorpo-
rated in the prices. He argues that there is evidence that prices incorporate
all publicly available relevant information.
However, the idea that prices reflect fundamental values has drawn crit-
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icism in public and academic discourse. A recent article in the Financial
Times states: “If the five-year plan was the Soviet bloc’s grand lie, here is
that of capitalism: that the market values of financial and other assets ac-
curately reflect the economic value they represent” (Financial Times, 2017).
In academia, there is also substantial criticism on the efficient market gospel.
Shiller (1981) stresses that real stock prices are much more volatile than would
be expected if markets were efficient. Surveying more recent developments,
Barberis and Thaler (2003) argue that agents deviate from rational decision
making in various ways and that this can have adverse consequences for the
correct pricing of financial assets, even in the presence of fully rational agents.
To understand why mispricing would occur, irrational behaviour needs
to be modelled (Hirshleifer, 2001). Recently, Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli,
and Shleifer (2016) introduced a model that captures how people form stereo-
types, amongst others about financial assets. In chapter 21, I investigate the
merits of this model in the context of the primary equity markets in the U.S.
Specifically, I investigate the extent to which first-day returns of IPOs in the
U.S. can be explained by stereotypes formed around industries based on past
first-day returns of IPOs by investors. The findings challenge the view that
first-day returns are fully determined by rational deliberations. They raise
the question to what extent prices in the primary equity markets are efficient
and, with that, to what extent this market allocates capital well.
1.2 Market liquidity
The liquidity of an asset is often defined as the ease with which the asset
can be traded. The liquidity of primary markets can affect the prices of new
1Chapter 2 is based on the paper ’Stereotypical IPO underpricing’, which is single-
authored work. It is available on my website (www.rogierhanselaar.nl).
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securities, and with that (adversely) affect economic growth. Even in efficient
markets where prices incorporate all information, it can be difficult to trade
against those prices if markets are illiquid. The absence of liquidity can have
consequences for funding decisions and the allocation of capital. Chapter 3
investigates whether liquidity matters for the issuance of new shares.
In an illiquid (but efficient) market, there typically are few buyers and
sellers willing to trade at the market price at any particular time. Trading
larger quantities of shares against the market price in one go, is therefore dif-
ficult. An investor who wishes to make a large change to his or her position in
an illiquid market, can spread out trades over time. However, if the investor
needs a more immediate execution of trades, other investors need to be en-
ticed to take the opposite side of the trade. To be able to buy or sell more
immediately, the investor needs to offer, respectively, a mark-up or discount
to the price. As a result, shares may trade for prices different than those that
reflect the fundamental value of the asset. For the investor wishing to make
a large change to his or her position, market illiquidity shows up as increased
trading costs.
A lack of liquidity can deter investors from investing in projects, regard-
less of expected returns (Levine, 1997). This is visible in the secondary stock
market, where investors tend to require higher returns for less liquid stocks
and for stocks that run the risk of becoming less liquid (Amihud and Mendel-
son, 1986, Amihud et al., 2006, Holden et al., 2014). However, the extent to
which liquidity has an impact on the real economy, depends on the extent to
which it affects funding decisions. Those funding decisions take place amongst
others in the primary stock markets.
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
In chapter 32, I investigate whether changes in stock market liquidity
affect the issuance of new shares. The findings show that liquidity is indeed
important, and has different effects depending on the type of issuing firm. The
results suggest that that liquidity affects funding liquidity more generally, can
influence the allocation of capital, and with that can have an effect on the
real economy.
1.3 Incentives from issuance
The types of securities a firm issues can affect its investment decisions. In
response to the 2008 financial crisis, regulation has been developed to encour-
age banks to issue Contingent Convertible bonds, also known as CoCos, to
make the financial system safer. Chapter 4 shows that the issuance of CoCos
makes banks choose more risky investments, at odds with the objective of a
safer financial system, and highlights that primary market activity can alter
incentives with real economic consequences.
Financing decisions of a firm do not affect its investment behavior, in a
frictionless world (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). When there are frictions, due
to the presence of taxes, bankruptcy risk, implicit government guarantees, or
other factors, the mix of securities financing the firm will affect decisions re-
garding investment. To see how financing may affect investment decisions,
consider an imaginary firm funded with little equity and much debt. If the
firm invests in a risky project, the shareholders will receive a large pay off
in good times. In bad times, only part of the losses will be absorbed by the
shareholders, the rest is absorbed by the debt holders. If additionally, the
2Chapter 3 is based on the paper ’Do firms issue more equity when markets become
more liquid?’, which is joint work with René Stulz and Mathijs van Dijk. It is available on
SSRN, and forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics. I was actively involved in
developing the hypotheses and methodology, and in doing the data work, data analysis, and
writing for this paper.
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government (implicitly) guaranteed to keep the firm afloat in bad times, the
losses for shareholders in bad times would be even smaller. As such, this spe-
cific mix of equity and debt, whether with additional government guarantees
or not, generates an asymmetric pay off to shareholders and incentivizes the
firm to take more risk than might be optimal from the perspective of other
investors and governments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, regulation has been developed to
encourage banks to issue CoCos, to make the financial system safer and shield
governments from having to step in in bad times. CoCos are bonds that are
converted to equity or (partially) written off when a bank makes large losses.
The conversion imposes the losses on the investors holding the CoCos, and
in case of a conversion to equity, (partly) on the existing shareholders. This
leaves the bank in better shape and reduces the chance that governments
needs to step in to save the bank.
However, a beneficial overall effect of using CoCos for funding banks,
partly rests on the assumption that investment choices of banks are not af-
fected by funding decisions. In the real world, this assumption is not necessar-
ily justified. Chapter 43 provides evidence that this assumption indeed does
not hold, and shows that banks tend to take on more risky loans after issuing
CoCos. It highlights how the mix of securities issued on primary markets can
affect incentives and have real economic consequences.
3Chapter 4 is based on the paper ’Risk-taking implications of contingent convertible
bonds’, which is joint work with Amiyatosh Purnanandam and Stefan Zeume. At the time
of writing, a first draft is available on my website (www.rogierhanselaar.nl), as well as
on that of Amiyatosh Purnanandam’s (webuser.bus.umich.edu/amiyatos/). I was actively
involved in developing the hypotheses and methodology, and in doing the data work, data
analysis, and writing for this paper.
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1.4 Closing remarks
This thesis focusses on primary market functioning and highlights how the
pricing of shares in initial public equity offerings is affected by stereotypes
about industries, how market liquidity affects equity issuance activity, and
how changed incentives due to the issuance of contingent convertible bonds
influence real economic choices in European banks. By fostering greater un-
derstanding of primary market functioning, this thesis may find its use as an
input in the debate on the extent to which financial markets need steering
and adjustment in our continuous striving to generate ever greater aﬄuence
in society.
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Chapter 3
Do firms issue more equity when markets become
more liquid?
Joint work with René Stulz and Mathijs van Dijk
ABSTRACT
Using quarterly data on IPOs and SEOs for 37 countries from 1995 to 2014, we
show that changes in equity issuance are positively related to lagged changes
in aggregate local stock market liquidity. This relation is as economically sig-
nificant as the well-known relation between equity issuance and lagged stock
returns. It survives the inclusion of proxies for market timing, capital market
conditions, growth prospects, asymmetric information, and investor senti-
ment. Changes in liquidity are less relevant for issuance by firms with greater
financial pressures, and by firms in less financially developed countries.
Forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics
64 Chapter 3. Do firms issue more equity when markets become more liquid?
3.1 Introduction
There is a large literature showing that aggregate stock market liquidity
changes over time within countries (e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam,
2005; Lesmond, 2005). Greater stock market liquidity means that it is easier
to sell shares without affecting their price. We therefore expect that increases
in stock market liquidity should be associated with increases in equity is-
suance. In this paper, we investigate this hypothesis using a sample of 37
countries from 1995 to 2014. We find strong support for the hypothesis that
equity issuance increases following improvements in stock market liquidity.
As a firm’s shares trade in a less liquid market, investors have to be given
more of a discount to absorb these shares. We would therefore expect that eq-
uity issuance is more costly for existing shareholders when a firm’s stock is less
liquid because an increase in the supply of shares has a greater price impact.
As issuance becomes more costly, firms are expected to issue less equity, every-
thing else equal. The liquidity of a firm’s common stock can worsen because
aggregate liquidity worsens or because of idiosyncratic shocks. Idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks could be caused by shocks to observed or unobserved firm
attributes, so that it is difficult to identify the impact of liquidity as opposed
to the impact of shocks to factors that affect liquidity as well as other firm
characteristics. For instance, adverse information about a firm could increase
information asymmetry which would lower liquidity. Since one would expect
an increase in information asymmetry to make it more expensive for a firm
to issue equity, identification of the liquidity effect on equity issuance when
liquidity changes because of information asymmetry would be challenging.
An additional complicating factor is that most individual firms issue equity
rarely, so that tests at the firm level are unlikely to have much power.
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In this paper, we resolve the identification issue in assessing the role of
liquidity in the issuance decision by focusing on equity issuance at the coun-
try level and by examining the relation between changes in aggregate equity
issuance and changes in aggregate liquidity. Aggregate liquidity could affect a
firm’s decision to issue equity because there are strong common factors in liq-
uidity (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001) and because aggregate
liquidity could proxy for the general capacity of the market to absorb new
shares. An additional advantage of studying the relation between changes in
equity issuance and changes in liquidity at the country level instead of the
firm level is that reverse causation is far less of a concern since new issues
tend to represent a small fraction of the overall market.
Like earlier papers that investigate equity issuance globally, such as Hen-
derson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) and Kim and Weisbach (2008), we
obtain data on equity issues from SDC and include both initial public of-
ferings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our dataset has 2,901
country-quarters. The measure of equity issuance we focus on is the number
of equity issues (IPOs and/or SEOs) by country in a given quarter. We use
the Amihud (2002) price impact proxy (estimated quarterly for each coun-
try based on stock level data) as our key liquidity measure. Since neither
the number of issues nor aggregate liquidity is a stationary variable, we take
first differences and run regressions of changes in equity issuance on changes
in liquidity. We demean and standardize each of the country level variables
by country, which enhances comparability across countries. Demeaning also
takes care of country fixed effects, which may be important since recent stud-
ies (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2013; Kim and Weisbach, 2008; McLean,
Zhang, and Zhao, 2011) note that countries differ along many dimensions that
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affect equity issuance. All of our regressions use quarterly data and include
time fixed effects.
When we regress changes in equity issuance on lead, contemporaneous,
and lagged changes in liquidity, we find that while the coefficient on lead liq-
uidity changes is not significant, contemporaneous liquidity changes as well
as the first three lagged liquidity changes have a positive and significant co-
efficient. Based on the three lagged coefficients, a one standard deviation
shock to liquidity is associated with an economically substantial 0.14 stan-
dard deviation cumulative shock to equity issuance over the subsequent three
quarters. Since a large literature shows that liquidity and market returns are
related (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, Hameed, Kang, and
Zhang, 2015), our tests also include these variables side-by-side. Doing so is
especially important because market returns are used to explain variation in
equity issuance by many studies (e.g., Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach,
2006; Huang and Ritter, 2016) and are often interpreted as a proxy for market
timing. We find positive and significant coefficients for contemporaneous as
well as the first three lagged market returns. These coefficients indicate that
a one standard deviation shock to returns is associated with a 0.13 standard
deviation cumulative shock to issuance over the next three quarters. Not only
is the relation between liquidity changes and changes in equity issuance eco-
nomically and statistically significant when we allow for a relation between
changes in equity issuance and stock returns, but the economic significance
of the liquidity coefficients is thus as large as the economic significance of the
coefficients on market returns.
After having established that changes in equity issuance are positively
related to liquidity changes, we examine whether this relation can be explained
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by variables known to be correlated with aggregate liquidity that could affect
equity issuance on their own. For example, U.S. studies predicting aggregate
seasoned equity issuance (e.g., Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 1993) and the
aggregate rate at which firms go public (e.g., Lowry, 2003) show that equity
issuance is affected by the state of capital markets and aggregate economic
activity, which are variables known to be related to liquidity as well.
Our first battery of tests therefore controls for proxies for general capital
market conditions, such as market volatility, turnover, and liquidity risk. It
is already known from the literature that aggregate equity issuance is lower
when market volatility is higher (e.g., Schill, 2004). While we find a negative
contemporaneous coefficient of market volatility in our regressions, the coeffi-
cient is insignificant and its inclusion does not affect the sum of the coefficients
on the liquidity variables. Similarly, market turnover is negatively related to
equity issuance, but the inclusion of market turnover in the regression has no
impact on the sum of the coefficients on liquidity. We find no evidence that
equity issuance is related to lagged liquidity risk, but it is positively related to
lead liquidity risk. Our evidence is thus consistent with firms timing liquidity
risk, but adding liquidity risk has no impact on the coefficients on liquidity
changes.
Since at least Amihud and Mendelson (1986), it is known that liquidity
is related to valuation. Specifically, higher liquidity is associated with lower
discount rates and higher valuations. It follows that one channel through
which liquidity could affect issuance is the valuation channel. We want to es-
tablish that liquidity impacts issuance separately from the valuation channel.
In other words, we want to show that there is a price pressure channel of the
impact of liquidity. Our approach is to control for lead, contemporaneous,
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and lagged valuation measures. Our benchmark regressions already control
for lead, contemporaneous, and lagged returns as proxies for market timing.
Next, we additionally include a number of direct proxies for the level of market
valuation. Market-to-book is used in studies of market timing (e.g., Loughran
and Ritter, 1995 ,1997; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Stulz, 2010). There is evidence that more liquid firms in the U.S. have a
higher market-to-book ratio (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009). After controlling
for liquidity and market returns, we find that the coefficients on contempora-
neous and lagged market-to-book are not significant. However, the coefficient
on the lead of market-to-book is positive and significant. Adding market-to-
book to our regressions leaves our inferences are unchanged. The addition
of other variables that capture market conditions also does not change our
inferences about the impact of market liquidity.
Recent research shows that liquidity is a predictor of economic activity
(e.g., Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2011). Since at least Miller (1963), poor
economic activity has been associated with lower equity issuance. We find
that when we control for proxies for future levels of economic activity, the
coefficients on the liquidity measures remain economically and statistically
significant.
We then turn to tests that focus more directly on the nature of the mech-
anism that explains the relation between liquidity and equity issuance. For
firms, an equity issuance has costs and benefits. Firms in good financial con-
dition can more easily postpone an equity issue if they believe that it will be
less costly in the future compared to firms that might be unable to pay their
bills without new funding. Huang and Ritter (2016) find that immediate cash
needs are “the primary predictor for net debt issuances and an important pre-
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dictor for net equity issuances.” They consider firms with low profitability and
high leverage to be firms that do not have a choice but to issue equity. When
we separate firms into those with positive return on assets (ROA) and those
with negative ROA, we expect firms with negative ROA to be less affected by
liquidity changes because they may have greater immediate cash needs and
would find it much more difficult to issue debt. We find that this is the case.
We also explore whether the relation between changes in equity issuance
and changes in liquidity differs across countries and across time. Countries
differ in the ease with which firms can issue equity. We expect firms in
more financially developed countries to be better able to react to changes in
liquidity. We find that this is the case. An obvious concern is that our results
could be driven by the financial crisis. When we remove the 2008-2011 period
from our sample, a period that includes the peak of the European sovereign
crisis as well as what is often referred to as the credit crisis, our results are
similar.
Our paper contributes to several literatures. Our primary contribution
is to the equity issuance literature. We find that liquidity is an important
determinant of equity issuance across the world. Though much of the recent
literature on equity issuance has focused on market timing motivations for
equity issuance, we show that liquidity’s economic significance as a determi-
nant of equity issuance is of the same magnitude as the economic significance
of variables that proxy for market timing. A growing recent literature empha-
sizes the interaction between market liquidity and funding liquidity, following
the work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The empirical literature on
this interaction has focused on financial institutions. The results in this paper
suggest that market liquidity affects funding liquidity more generally.
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There is a large literature that builds on the finding in Shleifer (1986)
that a firm’s stock price increases when it experiences an increase in demand
because of being added to a stock index such as the S&P 500. Studies with
access to data about demand curves for stocks find that demand curves are
downward-sloping (e.g., Bagwell, 1992; Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl, 1999. If
demand curves for stocks were perfectly elastic, we would not expect to find
a relation between equity issuance changes and changes in liquidity. Braun
and Larrain (2009) provide cross-country evidence on the impact of large
issuances by showing that large IPOs in emerging markets have permanent
adverse price impacts on correlated stocks. We contribute to this literature
by presenting evidence indicating that downward-sloping demand curves may
affect equity issuance.
Several papers investigate how stock liquidity affects some aspects of the
equity issuance process. In particular, Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005)
show that underwriters charge more when liquidity is lower and Gao and
Ritter (2010) demonstrate that underwriters affect the slope of the demand
function for shares through their marketing activities. Our paper adds to
that literature by showing that aggregate liquidity has a powerful relation
with security issuance.
Finally, there is a large literature on the role of liquidity in the pricing of
financial assets. In this paper, we provide evidence consistent with the view
that the role of liquidity extends beyond the boundaries of financial markets
and that it has a pervasive impact on corporate financial policies. While Fang,
Noe, and Tice (2009) and Lipson and Mortal (2009) show that stock liquidity
is related to a firm’s capital structure, such a finding does not necessarily
mean that firms are more likely to issue equity in more liquid markets. Our
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contribution therefore helps understand one mechanism whereby more liquid
firms have less leverage, namely that higher liquidity makes it less costly to
issue equity.
3.2 Data and methods
3.2.1 Issuance data
We obtain equity issuance data from the Securities Data Company (SDC).
We select all public issues that take place between 1995 and 2014 in the 37
developed and developing countries in our sample. We start our sample in
1995 because issuance data in SDC is sparse for a number of countries before
1995. We drop all issues in which non-common stock is issued and in which
no primary shares are offered. We also exclude all issues from utilities and
financial firms (SIC codes 49 and 6), as equity issuance by such firms may
be affected by regulations. We only include the main tranche of each issue
when there are multiple tranches, to avoid double counting and problems with
issues distributed across multiple exchanges or countries.
We remove foreign issues by comparing the country of domicile of the firm
to the location of the exchange on which the shares are issued. If information
on the location of the exchange is missing in SDC, it is supplemented with
information on exchange location from Datastream. We discard tiny issues,
defined as issues in which the number of shares issued is less than one percent
of the number of shares outstanding after the issue.
For issues in the U.S., we distinguish between those that take place on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Nasdaq, and other markets. We
keep issues on the first two markets and treat them as separate “countries.”
We discard the equity issues on the other U.S. markets. For issues in other
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countries, we eliminate all issues that did not take place on a main market.
Issues taking place on non-main markets are often subject to different (lighter)
sets of rules that are enforced by exchanges rather than by national regulators.
Vismara, Paleari, and Ritter (2012) show that issues on such markets are
sometimes closer to private placements than to public offerings, and that
such issues tend to be smaller in size. By filtering out issues on non-main
markets, we obtain a more homogeneous sample in terms of regulation and
issue size.
To identify main markets, we proceed as follows. We first link the SDC
market names to standardized market codes (Market Identifier Codes, or
MICs) where possible; we discard SDC market names that cannot be linked to
a MIC. We then classify the remaining markets in our sample into main mar-
kets and non-main markets as follows. For markets in Europe, we follow the
classification made by Vismara, Paleari, and Ritter (2012), who discuss the
rise and fall of second markets in Europe in detail. For markets elsewhere, we
classify markets based on information obtained from internet searches (e.g.,
exchange websites, news items). Finally, we use only the main markets that
are part of the exchange with the largest issuance proceeds. In five of the
countries in our sample, the main market is the result of a merger of separate
markets that took place during our sample period. In these cases, we include
issues on the merged market as well as on all “predecessor” markets, but we
do a robustness check dropping these five countries from the sample. We refer
to the Internet Appendix for a detailed discussion of our procedure to classify
markets into main markets and non-main markets.
We aggregate the number of issues by country (and in the case of the U.S.
per exchange) and by quarter based on the issue date, and use it as the main
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variable in our regressions. For each country, we set all quarters without issues
in SDC before the first quarter with a positive number of issues to missing; we
set all quarters without issues after the first quarter with a positive number
of issues in SDC to zero, as we assume that SDC coverage has started as of
that date.
3.2.2 Stock market data
We obtain daily data on prices, returns, volume, and shares outstanding for
individual common stocks for the U.S. from CRSP, and for the other countries
in our sample from Datastream, over the period from 1995 to 2014. We aim to
be conservative in what securities we consider common stocks. For the data
from CRSP, this is done by only including shares with share code 10 or 11.
For the data from Datastream, we use the list of common stocks compiled
by Hou and van Dijk (2017), which closely follows the data filters in Hou,
Karolyi, and Kho (2011).
We restrict the sample by only including stocks that are traded on a main
market, to be consistent with the equity issuance data and to avoid problems
with differences in trading mechanisms and conventions, similar to Karolyi,
Lee, and van Dijk (2012). Just like for equity issues, we split up U.S. stocks
into those that trade on the NYSE and those that trade on Nasdaq. For
Brazil and Germany, we only use data from 2000 onwards. For Brazil, there
is a change in trading definitions in 1999. Daily trading volume data is not
readily available for Germany before 2000 (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012).
We refer to the Internet Appendix for a description of how we verify that the
main markets identified in Datastream match those identified in SDC.
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3.2.2.1 Stock level liquidity
We use the price impact measure developed by Amihud (2002) as our (il)liquidity
measure. The Amihud measure is designed to capture the marginal impact of
a unit of trading volume on the stock price. It is computed as the daily ratio
of the absolute stock return over the local currency trading volume of the
stock. This measure stays close to the intuitive description of liquid markets
as those that accommodate trading with the least effect on price (e.g., Kyle,
1985).
Amihud (2002) shows that this measure is strongly positively related to
microstructure estimates of illiquidity for the U.S. stock market. Lesmond
(2005) reports a high correlation between the Amihud measure and bid-ask
spreads in 23 emerging markets. Hasbrouck (2009) and Goyenko, Holden,
and Trzcinka (2009) show that the Amihud measure performs well relative to
other proxies in capturing high-frequency measures of liquidity based on U.S.
data. Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2017) show that the Amihud measure
is among the best monthly price impact proxies to capture high-frequency
price impact measures based on global data. In contrast to high-frequency
measures of liquidity, we can readily compute the Amihud measure using
daily data for a large number of countries. Many recent empirical studies
use the Amihud measure to assess stock market liquidity, both for the U.S.
and for other countries (e.g.,Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Spiegel and Wang
2005; Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal 2006; Kamara, Lou, and Sadka 2008;
Watanabe and Watanabe 2008; Beber and Pagano 2013; Amihud, Hameed,
Kang, and Zhang 2015).
In constructing the Amihud measure, we stay close to the procedure de-
scribed in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). We set all non-trading days,
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non-trading months, and outliers to missing. We consider a day to be a non-
trading day if more than 90% of the stocks on a given exchange have a daily
return equal to zero; we consider a month for a particular stock to be a non-
trading month if zero-return days make up more than 80% of the total number
of days in the month. We define a daily return for a particular stock as an
outlier if it is in the top or bottom 0.1% of the cross-sectional distribution of
daily returns on that day within the same country.
We calculate the Amihud measure per stock per day as:
Liqi,d = −10, 000 × ln
(
1 + |Ri,d |
Pi,d × VOi,d
)
(3.1)
where Ri,d is the return of stock i on day d, Pi,d is the price, and VOi,d
is the trading volume in number of shares. In Equation 3.1, we take natural
logs of the standard Amihud proxy (absolute stock return divided by local
currency trading volume) to reduce the impact of outliers, and we multiply
the resulting measure by -10,000 to make it increasing in liquidity and to
avoid very small values. The Amihud measure takes on values of negative
infinity on days when there is no trading volume on a particular day for a
particular stock; we set these values to missing. We average the liquidity over
all trading days per month to obtain a monthly measure of liquidity for stock
i.
3.2.2.2 Stock level returns
We calculate monthly returns per stock from Datastream’s return index (RI)
and CRSP’s holding period returns (RET). We use the filter suggested by Ince
and Porter (2006) and discard a monthly stock return if (1+Ri,m)(1+Ri,m−1) ≤
0.5 , where Ri,m is the return of stock i in month m and where Ri,m or Ri,m−1
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is larger than 300
3.2.2.3 Stock level turnover
To measure turnover, we follow Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). We calcu-
late our turnover series as:
Turni,d = ln
(
1 + UVOi,d
NOSHi,d
)
− 1100
100∑
k=1
ln
(
1 + UVOi,d−k
NOSHi,d−k
)
(3.2)
where UVOi,d is the unadjusted trading volume of stock i on day d, and
NOSHi,d is the unadjusted number of shares outstanding. The second term
on the right hand side of the equation is a moving average of past turnover;
our turnover series is a deviation in turnover from this moving average. A
similar approach is taken in other studies (e.g., Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz,
2007; Lo and Wang, 2000).
3.2.2.4 Additional filters on stock market data and aggregation to
the country level
We set all monthly stock level liquidity, returns, and turnover values to missing
if the stock has a monthly price at the end of the previous month in the top or
bottom 1% of the cross-sectional distribution within a country, or if the stock
has a monthly return, monthly liquidity, or monthly turnover in the current
month in the top or bottom 1% of the cross-sectional distribution within a
country.
To obtain country level series, we average the monthly stock level liquidity,
returns, and turnover across all stocks within a country, weighting the stock
level series with their market capitalization. Subsequently, we average the
monthly country level variables across the months within a quarter to obtain
quarterly country level variables. Finally, we winsorize the quarterly country
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level time-series of liquidity and turnover at the 1st and 99th percentile by
country.
The country level Amihud liquidity proxy improves mechanically with
increases in stock market capitalization. To remedy this, we follow Acharya
and Pedersen (2005) and scale the liquidity series by country with the ratio of
the market capitalization lagged by one quarter and the first available market
capitalization for that country in the sample period:
Liq_Scaledc,q = liqc,q × MVc,0MVc,q (3.3)
where liqc,q is the liquidity in country c at quarter q, and MVc,q is the total
market value in country c at quarter q.
3.2.3 Other variables
We obtain estimates of quarterly return volatility by country as the standard
deviation of daily market returns within a quarter. We construct a quar-
terly time-series of liquidity risk by country as the conditional volatility of
country level liquidity based on a GARCH(1,1) model estimated by country
over the whole sample period. To obtain country level proxies for idiosyn-
cratic volatility and stock price synchronicity, we follow Morck, Yeung, and
Yu (2000) and first estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns on
daily market returns per quarter for each individual stock. We require at
least 15 non-missing observations per regression. From these regressions, we
calculate the R2 per stock per quarter, and the idiosyncratic volatility per
stock per quarter. We take the average of these series, weighted by market
capitalization, to obtain the average country level R2 as well as country level
idiosyncratic volatility. To obtain our measure of stock price synchronicity,
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we logistically transform the average country level R2 to prevent that its val-
ues always fall within the interval [0,1]. We obtain data on the country level
price-to-book value (PTBV), price-earnings ratio (PE), and dividend yield
(DY) from Datastream. As proxies for macroeconomic conditions, we down-
load data on GDP growth, sales growth, a leading economic indicator, and
closed-end funds from the IMF, OECD, and Bloomberg. A detailed descrip-
tion of all variable definitions and data sources is included in the Appendix
of this paper.
3.2.4 Unit roots, first differencing
For each country, the number of issues and the liquidity variables are tested for
stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. For several coun-
tries, non-stationarity cannot be rejected for one or both variables. This may
be due to the low power of the ADF tests to reject the null of non-stationarity
or due to the variables being truly non-stationary in nature. To avoid any
potential issues related to non-stationarity, we take the first difference of
both the number of issues by country and of country level liquidity. After
taking first differences of the number of issues and the liquidity variables,
non-stationarity of both variables is rejected for all countries in the sample.
Due to differences in trading volume definitions and currency values, the
means and standard deviations of the country level liquidity variable are not
comparable across countries. To enhance comparability, we therefore demean
and standardize each of the (changes in the) country level variables included
in the regressions by country. A beneficial side effect of this transformation
is that it facilitates the interpretation of the regression coefficients later on.
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3.2.5 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample. We have 22 exchanges
from developed countries, representing 21 countries. We have 16 emerging
countries. In total, we have 37 countries and 38 markets. The number of
issues per country varies greatly. Australia has the largest number of issues
and Portugal has the smallest number. In total, we have 45,840 issues. More
than three quarters of the issues are in developed countries. Of the total
number of equity issues, 35,401 are SEOs and 10,439 are IPOs. The U.S.
has the most IPOs. Table 1 shows the average and standard deviation of
stock returns. All countries have positive arithmetic average returns over our
sample period. The lowest standard deviation of returns is for New Zealand
and the highest is for India. On average, emerging markets have a higher
arithmetic average return and a higher standard deviation over our sample
period.
The level of the Amihud liquidity measure is not comparable across coun-
tries because of differences in trading volume definitions and currency units.
However, the standard deviation of the measure scaled by the absolute value
of the mean gives a sense of the volatility of Amihud liquidity that is com-
parable across countries. Canada has the lowest (standardized) volatility of
Amihud liquidity among developed countries. Amihud liquidity is consider-
ably more volatile in emerging countries. Amihud liquidity volatility scaled
by the absolute value of the mean averages 0.650 in developed countries and
1.066 in emerging countries.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics
This table reports the total number of equity issues (IPOs and SEOs from SDC), the
number of IPOs, the number of SEOs, the time-series average and standard deviation
(based on quarterly data) of local stock market returns (expressed in % per day), the
standard deviation of local market liquidity scaled by the absolute value of the time-
series average, and the time-series average of local market volatility for each of the 38
markets (37 countries; Nasdaq and NYSE are included separately) in our sample. The
sample covers the period 1995Q1-2014Q4 (with the exception of Brazil and Germany,
for which the data start in 2000Q1; Egypt, for which the data start in 1996Q4, and
Russia, for which the data start in 2000Q1). Market returns are value-weighted
average returns of common stocks from CRSP for the U.S., and from Datastream
for the other countries. Market liquidity is the value-weighted average across stocks
of the average daily estimates by month of Amihud’s (2002) price impact proxy for
individual stocks – computed as the absolute stock return divided by local currency
trading volume (and multiplied by -10,000 to obtain a measure that is increasing in
liquidity). Market volatility is the standard deviation of daily market returns within
a quarter. The table also depicts the total number of equity issues and the average
of the other variables for developed countries and for emerging countries, as well as
the grand total / average for developed and emerging countries jointly.
# IPOs # SEOs
market returns market market# equity liquidity volatility
issues mean st.dev. st.dev. mean/|mean|
Developed countries
Australia 17,558 1,516 16,042 0.061 0.114 0.537 0.018
Austria 72 28 44 0.053 0.19 0.425 0.011
Belgium 155 62 93 0.05 0.18 0.68 0.011
Canada 2,233 282 1,951 0.072 0.123 0.357 0.009
Denmark 178 54 124 0.068 0.165 0.891 0.02
Finland 163 53 110 0.077 0.212 0.481 0.013
France 700 325 375 0.062 0.159 0.425 0.011
Germany 737 301 436 0.033 0.176 0.386 0.012
Hong Kong 1,999 450 1,549 0.071 0.203 0.773 0.014
Israel 108 23 85 0.073 0.176 0.564 0.011
Italy 238 123 115 0.057 0.179 1.89 0.014
Japan 1,773 389 1,384 0.039 0.161 0.515 0.012
New Zealand 222 49 173 0.051 0.111 0.382 0.008
Norway 445 106 339 0.073 0.176 0.844 0.012
Singapore 900 281 619 0.052 0.177 0.709 0.011
Spain 127 28 99 0.052 0.161 0.621 0.012
Sweden 420 65 355 0.073 0.165 0.698 0.013
Switzerland 137 42 95 0.052 0.136 0.491 0.01
The Netherlands 188 42 146 0.06 0.187 0.856 0.013
United Kingdom 1,754 379 1,375 0.057 0.114 0.639 0.01
United States: Nasdaq 6,346 2,685 3,661 0.096 0.185 0.621 0.014
United States: NYSE 2,068 613 1,455 0.065 0.113 0.523 0.01
Total/average 38,521 7,896 30,625 0.061 0.162 0.65 0.012
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Table 3.1, continued
# IPOs # SEOs
market returns market market# equity liquidity volatility
issues mean st.dev. st.dev. mean/|mean|
Emerging countries
Brazil 251 71 180 0.126 0.2 2.368 0.014
Chile 194 20 174 0.06 0.153 1.304 0.008
Colombia 52 3 49 0.104 0.294 0.631 0.012
Egypt 159 18 141 0.071 0.27 0.952 0.014
Greece 162 103 59 0.035 0.307 0.991 0.018
India 2,303 1,040 1,263 0.095 0.31 0.599 0.012
Indonesia 331 197 134 0.138 0.297 1.927 0.016
Malaysia 1,120 427 693 0.053 0.216 0.811 0.01
Mexico 71 20 51 0.088 0.152 0.929 0.012
Philippines 204 57 147 0.075 0.206 1.169 0.012
Poland 300 164 136 0.072 0.218 1.039 0.014
Portugal 39 7 32 0.038 0.2 0.7 0.011
Russia 209 17 192 0.082 0.3 1.707 0.02
South Africa 154 24 130 0.082 0.136 0.548 0.01
South Korea 1,182 170 1,012 0.07 0.268 0.504 0.016
Thailand 588 205 383 0.064 0.252 0.88 0.014
Total/average 7,319 2,543 4,776 0.078 0.236 1.066 0.013
Developed and emerging countries
Grand total/average 45,840 10,439 35,401 0.068 0.193 0.825 0.013
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3.3 Does liquidity help explain time-variation in equity is-
suance?
Table 2 shows the results of panel regressions of changes in equity issuance
on changes in liquidity, market returns, and lagged issuance changes. The
change in equity issuance is the quarterly change in the equity issuance count
variable, i.e., the number of IPOs and SEOs. There is no need to include
country fixed effects since all variables are demeaned. To be conservative, we
include quarter fixed effects – analogous to one dummy for each year-quarter
combination (as opposed to four quarterly dummies) – to account for any
common global trends, although they subsume some of the time-variation in
equity issuance that could potentially be due to liquidity changes, such as the
global drop in liquidity in the last quarter of 2008. An additional benefit of
quarter fixed effects is that they account for potential seasonality, as prior
studies (e.g., Lowry, 2003) argue that there may be institutional reasons that
cause equity issuance to be less intense in the first calendar quarter. We
report both the overall R2 and the within R2 that indicates the fraction of
variation in the dependent variable after removing quarter fixed effects that
can be explained by the independent variables. Standard errors are clustered
by country and by quarter.
Model (1) of Table 2 includes the one-quarter lead change in market liq-
uidity, the contemporaneous change, four quarterly lagged changes, the same
leads and lags for market returns, and one lag of the change in the equity
issuance count variable. We include market returns as it is well-accepted that
equity issuance is related to market performance. We include lagged equity
issuance changes because equity issuance can be partly explained by recent
equity issuance. The coefficients on contemporaneous liquidity changes and
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Table 3.2. Panel regressions of changes in equity issuance on
changes in market liquidity and market returns
This table reports coefficient estimates of panel regressions using quarterly data from
38 countries (NYSE and Nasdaq counted separately) over the period 1995Q1-2014Q4.
The dependent variable is the change in the number of equity issues (common stock
IPOs and SEOs from SDC). Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous,
and lagged changes in local market liquidity, local market returns, and lagged depen-
dent variables. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All variables are demeaned
and standardized by country, so any coefficient can be interpreted as the effect in
standard deviations on the dependent variable of a one standard deviation shock to
the independent variable corresponding to that coefficient. Standard errors are clus-
tered by country and quarter. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated
by ***, **, and *.
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ market liquidity (t+2) 0.00
∆ market liquidity (t+1) -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
∆ market liquidity (t) 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09***
∆ market liquidity (t-1) 0.07*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08***
∆ market liquidity (t-2) 0.03* 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07***
∆ market liquidity (t-3) 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08***
∆ market liquidity (t-4) 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
∆ market liquidity (t-5) 0.01
∆ market liquidity (t-6) 0.00
∆ market liquidity (t-4:t-1) 0.20***
market returns (t+1) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
market returns (t) 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12***
market returns (t-1) 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11***
market returns (t-2) 0.02 0.05* 0.05 0.06** 0.05
market returns (t-3) 0.03 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06***
market returns (t-4) 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
market returns (t-4:t-1) 0.24***
∆ number of issues (t-1) -0.40*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.55***
∆ number of issues (t-2) -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.37***
∆ number of issues (t-3) -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.24***
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nobservations 2,837 2,831 2,787 2,864 2,880 2,831 2,853
Ncountries 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
R2
within
(%) 17.4 26.9 26.7 26.7 24.8 25.4 25.8
R2 (%) 28.8 37.0 37.0 36.7 35.1 35.7 35.9
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the first three lags of liquidity changes are all positive and statistically signif-
icant. With the scaling we use, the one-quarter lagged liquidity coefficient of
0.07 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in liquidity in quarter
t 1 is associated with an increase in equity issuance in quarter t correspond-
ing to 7% of the standard deviation of equity issuance. A contemporaneous
change in liquidity has a slightly bigger impact, at 0.10. The sum of all six
liquidity coefficients is 0.23. The lead change in liquidity is not significant, so
that firms do not appear to be able to time liquidity changes.
The coefficients on market returns are generally insignificant except for
the contemporaneous coefficient which is 0.09 and the first lag which is 0.07.
The sum of all six return coefficients in Model (1) is 0.24. Again, the lead
coefficient is not significant, so that firms do not appear to be able to time
aggregate market movements.
We see that the first lag of the dependent variable is highly significant with
a negative coefficient. The coefficient is -0.40, so that a one standard deviation
increase in equity issuance implies a decrease of almost half that increase the
next quarter, indicating strong mean reversion in equity issuance.
In Model (2), we use three lags of the dependent variable and find that
all of them are significant. With three lags of the dependent variable, the
contemporaneous change in market liquidity as well as the first three lags are
again significant. If we add further lags of the dependent variable to Model
(2) (not tabulated), the coefficients on the additional lags drop sharply and
our inferences are unaffected.
We now consider the economic significance of the liquidity effects in more
detail. The sum of the coefficients on the liquidity variables is a straightfor-
ward indication of the overall effect of variation in liquidity on variation in
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equity issuance that we use throughout the paper. In Model (2), the sum of
all six liquidity coefficients is 0.31. Since the coefficients can be interpreted as
the effect in standard deviations of the dependent variable when the indepen-
dent variables are shocked by one standard deviation, the liquidity effects are
economically sizable. An alternative way to assess economic significance is to
trace the effect of a one-time, one standard deviation shock to liquidity on the
development evolution of equity issuance over subsequent quarters. To do so,
we have to take into account the impact of the lags of the dependent variable
because shocks to liquidity not only affect future equity issuance directly, but
also indirectly through the lagged dependent variable. Taking these effects
into account, the three significant liquidity coefficients at lags one through
three in Model (2) indicate that a one standard deviation shock to liquidity
is associated with an economically substantial 0.14 standard deviation cumu-
lative shock to equity issuance over the subsequent three quarters.
The three significant return coefficients in Model (2) indicate that a one
standard deviation shock to returns is associated with a 0.13 standard de-
viation cumulative shock to issuance over the next three quarters, which is
similar to the effect of a shock to liquidity. We note that the fact that the
sum of the lagged dependent variables is more negative than -1 does not in-
dicate that there is more than mean reversion in the number of issues. A one
standard deviation increase in issuance is associated with a 0.56 decrease in
issuance over the next quarter, a 0.056 decrease over the next two quarters,
and a 0.01 increase over the next three quarters. In other words, there is
strong mean reversion in the dependent variable quarter-to-quarter, but, due
to the interaction of the negative coefficients on the lagged dependent variable
at different lags, the cumulative effect of a shock to the dependent variable
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actually almost dampens out two and three quarters ahead.
In Model (3), we add one additional lead change in market liquidity and
two additional lagged changes. Doing so has no material impact on our in-
ferences and the added variables do not have significant coefficients. When
we remove the lead changes for market liquidity and market returns in Model
(4), our inferences are also not affected. In Model (5), instead of using lags of
market liquidity changes and market returns, we use the cumulative change
in liquidity and the cumulative market return from quarter t-4 to t-1. We
find that the coefficients on the cumulative change in market liquidity and
on the cumulative market return are similar (0.20 versus 0.24) and that both
coefficients are significant at the 1
In all the regressions shown so far, we include both changes in market
liquidity and stock returns. An obvious concern is that these variables are
correlated, in that it is known from the literature that improvements in liquid-
ity are associated with positive stock returns (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson,
1986; Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2009; Bali, Peng, Shen, and Tang,
2014). Model (6) shows estimates when we omit stock returns. We see that
the coefficients on liquidity changes are mostly unaffected. When we omit
changes in liquidity in Model (7), we find that the coefficients on returns are
mostly unchanged as well. It follows that our inferences about the economic
importance of liquidity changes relative to stock returns in explaining varia-
tion in equity issuance are not sensitive to the correlation between liquidity
changes and returns. However, we note that both the within R2 and the
overall R2 of Model (7) are slightly greater than those of Model (6).
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3.4 Is the relation between liquidity and equity issuance due
to other factors?
The results in the previous section show that equity issuance is positively
related to liquidity, even after controlling for market returns. It is well-known
that liquidity is related to financial market conditions as well as to macroe-
conomic conditions (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Chordia,
Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005; Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2011) and
that financial market conditions and macroeconomic conditions are related
to equity issuance (e.g., Lowry, 2003). Hence, it could be the case that our
liquidity variables proxy for other factors that affect equity issuance and are
correlated with liquidity. In this section, we investigate whether the effects
of liquidity can be explained by other financial and economic variables, in-
cluding capital market conditions, (expected) economic activity, asymmetric
information, and investor sentiment.
3.4.1 Market conditions, liquidity, and equity issuance
We turn first to regressions that add variables that proxy for market condi-
tions to our benchmark regression. The results are shown in Table 3, where
Model (1) is our benchmark regression (Model (2) of Table 2) reproduced to
make comparisons easier.
In Model (2) of Table 3, we add lead, contemporaneous, and lagged
changes in market volatility to our benchmark model that includes market
liquidity and returns. Our measure of market volatility is the standard de-
viation of daily market returns during that quarter. We know that liquidity
is negatively related to volatility (e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam,
2005), and Schill (2004) shows that there are fewer equity issues in volatile
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Table 3.3. Panel regressions of changes in equity issuance on
changes in market liquidity: Controlling for market conditions
This table reports coefficient estimates of panel regressions using quarterly data from
38 countries (NYSE and Nasdaq counted separately) over the period 1995Q1-2014Q4.
The dependent variable is the change in the number of equity issues (common stock
IPOs and SEOs from SDC). Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous,
and lagged changes in local market liquidity, local market returns, changes in local
market volatility, changes in local market turnover, changes in local market liquidity
risk, changes in the local market-to-book ratio, changes in the local price-earnings
ratio, changes in the local dividend-price ratio, changes in the local dividend yield,
and lagged dependent variables. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. In Model
(1) of this table, we reproduce the benchmark regression Model (2) of Table 2. All
variables are demeaned and standardized by country, so any coefficient can be in-
terpreted as the effect in standard deviations on the dependent variable of a one
standard deviation shock to the independent variable corresponding to that coeffi-
cient. Standard errors are clustered by country and quarter. Significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *.
times using U.S. data. It is thus possible that the effects of liquidity in Table
2 capture the role of market volatility. Surprisingly, none of the changes in
market volatility have a significant coefficient in our global dataset. Adding
changes in market volatility to the regression has no material impact on our
inferences about the relation between equity issuance and market liquidity
from Table 2.
Baker and Stein (2004) argue that market liquidity is a sentiment indicator
and that periods of positive sentiment coincide with intense equity issuance.
Using turnover as a liquidity proxy, they show that liquidity is positively
correlated with aggregate time-variation in U.S. equity issuance. Model (3)
of Table 3 shows that the relation between liquidity and equity issuance in
our global sample is not driven by turnover since adding turnover changes
has no material impact on the coefficient on market liquidity changes. It is
interesting to note that, controlling for market liquidity changes, turnover
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3.3, continued
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ market liquidity (t+1) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
∆ market liquidity (t) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08***
∆ market liquidity (t-1) 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07**
∆ market liquidity (t-2) 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
∆ market liquidity (t-3) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05***
∆ market liquidity (t-4) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
market returns (t+1) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04*
market returns (t) 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.04
market returns (t-1) 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.1*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05* 0.02
market returns (t-2) 0.05* 0.06** 0.05* 0.06* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
market returns (t-3) 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.05 0.05* 0.06* 0.04
market returns (t-4) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
∆ market volatility (t+1) 0.05 0.07**
∆ market volatility (t) -0.02 -0.01
∆ market volatility (t-1) 0.01 -0.02
∆ market volatility (t-2) 0.04 0.02
∆ market volatility (t-3) 0.05 0.02
∆ market volatility (t-4) 0.03 0.01
∆ market turnover (t+1) -0.08*** -0.10***
∆ market turnover (t) -0.15*** -0.16***
∆ market turnover (t-1) -0.10** -0.08*
∆ market turnover (t-2) -0.09* -0.06
∆ market turnover (t-3) -0.04 -0.02
∆ market turnover (t-4) 0.00 0.02
∆ market liquidity risk (t+1) 0.06** 0.06**
∆ market liquidity risk (t) 0.01 0.01
∆ market liquidity risk (t-1) -0.01 -0.01
∆ market liquidity risk (t-2) 0.01 0.00
∆ market liquidity risk (t-3) 0.01 0.00
∆ market liquidity risk (t-4) 0.01 0.01
∆ market-to-book ratio (t+1) 0.05** 0.05**
∆ market-to-book ratio (t) 0.04 0.01
∆ market-to-book ratio (t-1) 0.02 0.01
∆ market-to-book ratio (t-2) 0.04 0.03
∆ market-to-book ratio (t-3) 0.01 0.00
∆ market-to-book ratio (t-4) 0.00 0.01
∆ price-earnings ratio (t+1) 0.01 -0.01
∆ price-earnings ratio (t) 0.04** 0.03
∆ price-earnings ratio (t-1) 0.05* 0.03
∆ price-earnings ratio (t-2) 0.05*** 0.04*
∆ price-earnings ratio (t-3) 0.01 0.00
∆ price-earnings ratio (t-4) 0.01 0.01
∆ dividend-yield (t+1) -0.08***-0.07***
∆ dividend-yield (t) -0.09***-0.07***
∆ dividend-yield (t-1) -0.06***-0.05*
∆ dividend-yield (t-2) -0.04 -0.03
∆ dividend-yield (t-3) 0.00 -0.01
∆ dividend-yield (t-4) 0.01 0.01
∆ number of issues (t-1) -0.56***-0.56***-0.57***-0.56***-0.57***-0.57***-0.57***-0.58***
∆ number of issues (t-2) -0.37***-0.37***-0.38***-0.37***-0.39***-0.38***-0.39***-0.39***
∆ number of issues (t-3) -0.23***-0.23***-0.23***-0.24***-0.24***-0.24***-0.24***-0.24***
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nobservations 2,831 2,831 2,831 2,825 2,671 2,673 2,673 2,666
Ncountries 38 38 38 38 36 36 36 36
R2
within
(%) 26.9 27.2 27.5 27 27.6 27.7 28 29.3
R2 (%) 37.0 37.3 37.6 37.2 37.1 37.1 37.4 38.6
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changes have negative coefficients. The lead, contemporaneous, and two of
the lagged coefficients are significant.
Model (4) shows that the contemporaneous relation between liquidity and
equity issuance survives controlling for a proxy for liquidity risk (conditional
liquidity volatility based on a GARCH(1,1) model estimated by country).
Adding liquidity risk changes has no material impact on our estimates of the
coefficients on liquidity changes.
Although we control for potential market timing effects using lead, con-
temporaneous, and lagged market returns, many studies use the market-to-
book ratio as a proxy for market timing (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Stulz, 2010). Huang and Ritter (2016) use Tobin’s q instead of market-to-
book, but the two measures are typically highly correlated. Since more liquid
firms in the U.S. have a higher market-to-book ratio (Fang, Noe, and Tice,
2009), we want to make sure that liquidity is not picking up the effect of
market-to-book. We use a measure of the aggregate market-to-book ratio,
which is obtained by summing up the market capitalization of all individual
stocks in a country and dividing by the sum of equity book values. Again,
our inferences are not meaningfully affected by controlling for changes in the
market-to-book ratio. The sum of the coefficients on market-to-book changes
is 0.16, which is smaller than the sum of the coefficients for market liquidity of
0.30. (We note that coefficients can be directly compared across independent
variables because they are standardized.) Perhaps not surprisingly, adding
market-to-book has an adverse impact on the significance of the coefficients
on market returns. Another measure of valuation that may be relevant for
market timing is the price-earnings ratio. Again, adding that variable has
no material impact on our results, as can be seen in Model (6). Lastly, we
Chapter 3. Do firms issue more equity when markets become more liquid? 91
use the dividend-yield ratio. Not surprisingly, a higher dividend-yield ratio
is negatively related to equity issuance changes. The lead, contemporaneous,
and one-quarter lagged coefficients are significant. However, our inferences
about the relation between equity issuance changes and liquidity changes are
unaffected.
The last regression in Table 3, Model (8), uses all the variables introduced
in Models (2) to (7). Obviously, these variables are correlated. It is note-
worthy that adding all these variables to our benchmark model increases the
within R2 by only 2.4% relative to Model (1). When we add all these vari-
ables, the magnitude of the coefficients on lagged liquidity changes is little
affected. The contemporaneous and first three lags of liquidity changes still
have significant coefficients. It is noteworthy that in this specification the
lead of market returns has a positive significant coefficient, but none of the
other market return variables have significant coefficients.
Though we do not reproduce the results in the table, we also estimate
Model (2) of Table 2 adding proxies for the closed-end fund discount, which
is used as a measure of sentiment (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991). We
construct the country closed-end fund discount variables in the same way
as Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). They construct time-series of local
closed-end country fund discounts for 22 of the countries in our sample based
on a sample of 42 closed-end funds. Unfortunately, because of the limited
availability of the closed-end fund discounts, our sample drops in half. Adding
these variables has no impact on our inferences.
3.4.2 Macroeconomic conditions, liquidity, and equity issuance
It is well-known that expectations about macroeconomic conditions are re-
lated to equity issuance as well as to liquidity. In Table 4, we investigate the
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relation between changes in equity issuance and changes in market liquidity
when we control for changes in various proxies for macroeconomic conditions.
Admittedly, some of the variables used in Table 4 could fit equally well in
Table 3. As with Table 3, we reproduce our benchmark regression Model (2)
of Table 2 in the first column of the Table to make comparisons easier.
Table 3.4. Panel regressions of changes in equity issuance on
changes in market liquidity: Controlling for macro conditions
This table reports coefficient estimates of panel regressions using quarterly data from
38 countries (NYSE and Nasdaq counted separately) over the period 1995Q1-2014Q4.
The dependent variable is the change in the number of equity issues (common stock
IPOs and SEOs from SDC). Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous,
and lagged changes in local market liquidity, local market returns, business cycle
proxies (GDP growth, sales growth, and leading economic indicator growth), asym-
metric information proxies (changes in local stock price synchronicity and changes
in idiosyncratic volatility), and lagged dependent variables. Variable definitions are
in the Appendix. In Model (1) of this table, we reproduce the benchmark regression
Model (2) of Table 2. All variables are demeaned and standardized by country, so any
coefficient can be interpreted as the effect in standard deviations on the dependent
variable of a one standard deviation shock to the independent variable corresponding
to that coefficient. Standard errors are clustered by country and quarter. Significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *.
Recent studies show that liquidity forecasts economic activity (e.g., Næs,
Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2011) and we know from the equity issuance lit-
erature that firms issue more equity in anticipation of better economic con-
ditions. Following Lowry (2003), we proxy for expectations about economic
conditions using GDP growth in Model (2) and sales growth in Model (3)
of Table 4. Lowry introduces these variables as proxies for the demand for
capital. Adding the lead, contemporaneous, and four lags of GDP growth
does not affect the coefficients on market liquidity materially and does not
change our inferences. None of the coefficients on GDP growth are significant.
Surprisingly, the coefficients are not only statistically insignificant, but they
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3.4, continued
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ market liquidity (t+1) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
∆ market liquidity (t) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06***
∆ market liquidity (t-1) 0.08** 0.04* 0.05* 0.06** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.05*
∆ market liquidity (t-2) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08***
∆ market liquidity (t-3) 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09***
∆ market liquidity (t-4) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
market returns (t+1) 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03
market returns (t) 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10***
market returns (t-1) 0.10*** 0.07** 0.06** 0.06** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.05
market returns (t-2) 0.05* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.05* 0.05* 0.07
market returns (t-3) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09***
market returns (t-4) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
GDP growth (t+1) 0.00 -0.02
GDP growth (t) -0.03 0.00
GDP growth (t-1) 0.03 0.05
GDP growth (t-2) -0.02 -0.03
GDP growth (t-3) -0.02 -0.08
GDP growth (t-4) 0.03 0.08*
sales growth (t+1) 0.00 0.01
sales growth (t) 0.04 0.04
sales growth (t-1) -0.05 -0.05
sales growth (t-2) -0.05** -0.05**
sales growth (t-3) 0.04* 0.05***
sales growth (t-4) 0.00 -0.01
leading economic indicator growth (t+1) 0.03 0.15
leading economic indicator growth (t) 0.13 -0.46*
leading economic indicator growth (t-1) -0.31 0.74**
leading economic indicator growth (t-2) 0.48 -0.69*
leading economic indicator growth (t-3) -0.56 0.43
leading economic indicator growth (t-4) 0.45 -0.14
∆ idiosyncratic volatility (t+1) -0.17 0.03 0.02
∆ idiosyncratic volatility (t) -0.01 -0.07
∆ idiosyncratic volatility (t-1) 0.01 0.01
∆ idiosyncratic volatility (t-2) 0.07*** 0.05
∆ idiosyncratic volatility (t-3) 0.02 0.01
∆ idiosyncratic volatility (t-4) 0.02 0.05*
∆ stock price synchronicity (t+1) 0.04 0.06**
∆ stock price synchronicity (t) 0.00 -0.01
∆ stock price synchronicity (t-1) -0.01 -0.01
∆ stock price synchronicity (t-2) -0.01 -0.02
∆ stock price synchronicity (t-3) 0.01 0.04
∆ stock price synchronicity (t-4) 0.01 0.04
∆ number of issues (t-1) -0.56***-0.58***-0.58***-0.58***-0.56***-0.56***-0.58***
∆ number of issues (t-2) -0.37***-0.38***-0.39***-0.37***-0.37***-0.37***-0.38***
∆ number of issues (t-3) -0.23***-0.25***-0.25***-0.25***-0.24***-0.23***-0.25***
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nobservations 2,831 2,322 2,155 2,303 2,815 2,815 2,091
Ncountries 38 32 30 31 38 38 29
R2
within
(%) 26.9 28.5 28.6 28.3 27.2 27.0 29.4
R2 (%) 37.0 40.3 41.3 40.0 37.3 37.1 42.1
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are economically small as well. In Model (3), we reach similar conclusions
when we add sales growth. In Model (4), we include the composite leading
economic indicator of the OECD (only available for OECD countries). None
of the coefficients are significant. Adding the leading indicator has no material
impact on our inferences.
It is well-documented that the liquidity of a stock is inversely related to
the degree of asymmetric information about the stock’s value. More asym-
metric information is also likely to lead to greater costs of raising equity
capital, so changes in information asymmetries could influence liquidity and
equity issuance simultaneously and in the same direction. As argued in the
introduction, this identification issue is unlikely to be of great concern in
our analysis of the relation between aggregate liquidity and aggregate equity
issuance. Nonetheless, it may be the case that market-wide fluctuations in
information asymmetries affect aggregate liquidity and aggregate issuance at
the same time and in a similar way. In Model (5) of Table 4, we include a
proxy for market-wide variation in information asymmetries, namely a mea-
sure of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. The idiosyncratic volatility proxy is
computed as the value-weighted average of the residual volatility from mar-
ket model regressions run for each individual stock within a country. We find
again that our inferences from Table 2 are unaffected when we add changes
in idiosyncratic volatility. The only coefficient that is significant for idiosyn-
cratic volatility changes is the coefficient for lag two, which is positive with
a value of 0.07. In Model (6), we add “stock price synchronicity” changes as
an alternative proxy for information asymmetries. Stock price synchronicity
is computed as the value-weighted average R2 from market model regressions
run for each individual stock within a country. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000)
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argue that greater stock price synchronicity is associated with less-informative
stock prices. Our inferences are not affected by the inclusion of stock price
synchronicity.
In Model (7) of Table 4, we include all control variables from Models
(2)-(6) simultaneously. Although we lose degrees of freedom due to a con-
siderable reduction in the sample size because variables are missing for some
country-quarters, the coefficients on contemporaneous and the first three lags
of liquidity changes remain significant. Overall, the results in Tables 3 and
4 suggest that the positive relation between market liquidity and aggregate
equity issuance is unlikely to be due to economic or financial variables that
are unrelated to the aggregate demand elasticity of the stock market, but
could simultaneously affect liquidity and equity issuance for other reasons.
3.5 The determinants of the relation between equity issuance
and liquidity change
In this section, we investigate the determinants of the relation between equity
issuance changes and liquidity changes by exploring how the relation differs
across countries, firm and issue types, time, and type of liquidity shocks. We
also investigate whether there is a relation between changes in equity issuance
proceeds (as opposed to counts) and liquidity changes.
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Table 3.5. The determinants of the relation between changes in
equity issuance and changes in liquidity
This table reports coefficient estimates of panel regressions using quarterly data from
38 countries (NYSE and Nasdaq counted separately) over the period 1995Q1-2014Q4.
The dependent variables are the change in the number of equity issues and the
change in the proceeds from equity issues (common stock IPOs and SEOs from
SDC). Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous, and lagged changes in
local market liquidity, local market returns, and lagged dependent variables. In
Panel A, Model (1) reproduces the benchmark regression Model (2) of Table 2. In
Models (2) and (3), the sample of issues is split into those by firms with positive and
negative return on assets (ROA) in the year of the issue. In Models (4) and (5), the
countries are split into financially developed and financially emerging, based on their
average stock market capitalization to GDP over the sample period. Model (6) is the
same as Model (1) but excludes the crisis period 2008Q1-2011Q4. Model (7) only
includes the crisis period. In Panel B, Model (1) again reproduces the benchmark
regression Model (2) of Table 2. In Models (2)-(5), the sample of issues is split into
SEOs and IPOs; in Models (3) and (5), the crisis period is excluded. In Models (6)
and (7), changes in proceeds are used as the dependent variable; in Model (7) the
crisis period is excluded. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All variables are
demeaned and standardized by country, so any coefficient can be interpreted as the
effect in standard deviations on the dependent variable of a one standard deviation
shock to the independent variable corresponding to that coefficient. Standard errors
are clustered by country and quarter (except in Model (5) of Panel B, where only
clustering by quarter is used). Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated
by ***, **, and *.
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Firms may have to issue equity with different degrees of urgency. In
particular, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) show that many firms that
issue equity would have a cash flow deficit without the equity issue. Huang
and Ritter (2016) show more generally that firms that are likely to run out of
funds issue securities. They take the view that, among firms that are likely
to run out of funds, firms with low profitability and high leverage are firms
that have no choice but to issue equity. We expect that if a firm has to issue
equity with a great degree of urgency, variation in liquidity will not have much
impact on its decision. To investigate this hypothesis, we split issuing firms
into issuers that have positive return on assets in the year of the issue (ROA,
obtained from Datastream) versus issuers that have negative return on assets.
Firms with negative ROA are unlikely to postpone issuing equity because the
market has become less liquid as they may require new funds simply to stay
afloat.
We show the results in Panel A of Table 5. As before, Model (1) repro-
duces our benchmark model for comparison. Model (2) shows the regression
estimates for the sub-sample of issuers with positive ROA. The coefficients on
contemporaneous liquidity changes as well as the first three lags of liquidity
changes are positive and significant. The sum of the coefficients on liquidity
changes is 0.27. When we turn to the coefficients on market returns, the con-
temporaneous market return and the first lag are significant. The sum of the
coefficients is 0.27. It follows that for these firms there is a strong relation be-
tween equity issuance changes and liquidity changes. When we turn to firms
with negative ROA in Model (3), only the coefficients on contemporaneous
and lag three of market liquidity changes are (marginally) significant. The
sum of the coefficients is 0.16. Essentially, there is a much weaker relation
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between equity issuance changes and market liquidity changes for these firms.
The coefficients on market returns are also smaller, but the lead, contempo-
raneous, and first lag of market returns have a significant coefficient. None of
the coefficients exceeds 0.06.
We next investigate how the issuance/liquidity relation is affected by a
country’s financial development. There are good reasons to think that the
equity issuance decision is different in financially developed countries versus
other countries. In more financially developed countries, we expect firms to be
better able to issue equity rapidly and take advantages of changes in circum-
stances. In such countries, the stock market is more established and deeper.
There is a vast literature showing that firms in less financially developed coun-
tries often find it advantageous to issue equity outside their country, taking
advantage of better developed stock markets (e.g., Henderson, Jegadeesh, and
Weisbach, 2006). Our measure of financial development is the average of the
annual ratio of aggregate stock market capitalization to GDP over our sample
period (obtained from the World Bank) and we define financially developed
countries as the ones in the top half of the sample based on this measure.
Model (4) in Panel A of Table 5 estimates the benchmark model for fi-
nancially developed countries. The market liquidity change variables have
significant positive coefficients contemporaneously and at lags one through
three. The sum of the coefficients of 0.46 is almost 50% higher than that of
the benchmark model. The sum of the coefficients on the stock return vari-
ables is only slightly larger than in the benchmark model, at 0.44. Hence,
the economic importance of the coefficients on liquidity changes is substantial
for financially developed countries, and about the same as the economic im-
portance of the coefficients on stock returns. Turning to the less financially
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developed (or financially emerging) countries in Model (5), we see that no
coefficient on liquidity changes is significant except for the second and third
lag. The sum of the coefficients on liquidity changes is 0.15. The sum of the
coefficients on stock returns is slightly smaller than in the benchmark regres-
sion, so we find that for less financially developed countries, there appears
to be a much weaker relation between equity issuance changes and liquidity
while there is a slightly weaker relation between equity issuance and stock
returns. In unreported tests, we estimate Models (2)-(5) of Table 5 with ad-
ditional variables, including leading economic indicators, turnover, changes
in the price-earnings ratio, and changes in idiosyncratic volatility, and our
conclusions are unchanged.
We consider next whether the impact of changes in liquidity on equity
issuance is different during the financial crisis. We examine how our results
depend on the crisis by identifying a crisis period from 2008 to 2011. This
period is chosen to include the credit crisis and the European sovereign debt
crisis. If we estimate the benchmark regression excluding the crisis period,
the sum of the liquidity coefficients is 0.29. These estimates are shown in
Model (6). We estimate the same model for the crisis period. The results are
shown in Model (7). We find that the coefficients on the contemporaneous,
and lags two and three of the liquidity coefficients are significant and the sum
of the coefficients is 0.35. It follows that changes in liquidity during the crisis
period have a similar effect as those outside of the crisis.
The regressions shown so far are based on the number of initial public
offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity issuances (SEOs) combined. An obvious
question is whether our inferences hold separately for IPOs and SEOs. We
show results in Panel B of Table 5. As before, the first regression in Panel
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B reproduces our benchmark regression. Model (2) estimates our benchmark
regression for SEOs only. We find that lags one, two and three as well as
contemporaneous liquidity changes are significant. When we exclude the crisis
period from the SEO sample in Model (3), we find that lead liquidity changes
are also significant. This finding could be consistent with the idea that since
it tends to be possible to execute SEOs at relatively short notice, firms may
be able to time their SEOs ahead of decreasing market liquidity. Models (4)
and (5) show that, with and without the crisis period, for IPOs, only the
coefficients on the first three lags of liquidity changes are significant. The fact
that contemporaneous and lead liquidity changes do not significantly affect
IPOs fits with the idea that it is more costly to time IPOs than SEOs to
take advantage of changes in liquidity. Overall, we conclude that the effect of
liquidity on issuance obtains for both SEOs and IPOs.
Our last investigation in Panel B of Table 5 looks at the relation between
the aggregate proceeds from equity issues (instead of the number of issues)
and liquidity. In most countries, proceeds are noisy since an issue by a large
firm can make a big difference in the total amount of proceeds. In contrast,
whether a large firm issues instead of a small firm has no impact on the
number of issues. Model (6) shows that when we include the crisis period
there is no relation between changes in aggregate proceeds and changes in
market liquidity. When we exclude the crisis period in Model (7), only the
third lag of liquidity changes has a positive and significant coefficient. The
lead of liquidity changes has a negative and significant coefficient, which is
consistent with market timing.
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3.6 Robustness
As a first additional check of the robustness of our main results, we inves-
tigate whether taking into account the effects of liquidity changes allows for
better out-of-sample predictions of changes in equity issuance by performing
a one-step-ahead forecasting exercise. While relevant in itself, this exercise
also shows whether the liquidity effects found in the analyses so far are stable
as opposed to sample-specific. To this end, we divide the sample period into
an in-sample part and an out-of-sample part. We first estimate coefficients
in-sample using a panel regression with quarter fixed effects, and subsequently
use the estimated coefficients to make a one-quarter-ahead out-of-sample fore-
cast of changes in equity issuance. We then compare the forecasts to the actual
values in the out-of-sample part, expand the in-sample estimation window by
one quarter and repeat the exercise. We continue until we reach the end of
the sample period.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 6 show the mean-squared prediction errors
(MSPEs), for in-sample starting periods of, respectively, the first 30%, 50%,
and 70% of the sample period. Each panel contains two pairs of models.
Model (1) is a benchmark model that represents a naive forecast: the forecast
of next quarter’s equity issuance changes equals the average change in equity
issuance over the in-sample estimation window. In contrast, in Model (2), the
forecast of next quarter’s change in equity issuance is a function of the three
significant lags of liquidity changes from Model (2) of Table 2. In Panels A, B
and C, the MSPE is lower in Model (2) than in Model (1), both when the cri-
sis period is included in the sample and when it is not. Diebold-Mariano tests
(Diebold and Mariano, 1995) show that these decreases in prediction errors
are significant. In other words, using liquidity changes to predict next quar-
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ter’s equity issuance changes significantly improves forecasting performance
relative to the naive forecast.
Table 3.6. Out-of-sample prediction of changes in equity issuance
with changes in liquidity
This table reports mean-squared prediction errors (MSPEs) of out-of-sample forecasts
of changes in the number of issues (common stock IPOs and SEOs from SDC) using
quarterly data from 38 countries (NYSE and Nasdaq counted separately) over the
period 1995Q1-2014Q4. Iteratively, coefficients are estimated in-sample using a panel
regression with quarter fixed effects, and are used to make an one-quarter ahead out-
of-sample forecast of equity issuance changes. After each iteration, the in-sample
window is expanded by one quarter. In Panel A, the in-sample estimation window
initially includes the first 30% of the sample period; in Panel B, the first 50%; in
Panel C, the first 70%. Independent variables include lagged changes in market
liquidity, lagged market returns, and lagged changes in the number of issues. Results
are presented both with and without the crisis period 2008Q1-2011Q4. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. All variables are demeaned and standardized by
country. The columns labelled “DM-test” indicate whether the model is significantly
different from the model indicated in parentheses, based on Diebold-Mariano (1995)
tests. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *.
Panel A: In-sample estimation window of first 30% of sample period
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues
Model Independent variables with crisis without crisisMSPE DM-test MSPE DM-test
(1) average (∆ number of issues (1:t)) 1.0851 0.9293
(2) ∆ market liquidity (t-1:t-3) 1.0677 (1): *** 0.9086 (1): ***
(3) ∆ number of issues (t-1:t-3) 0.7853 0.6806
+ market returns (t-1:t-3)
(4) ∆ number of issues (t-1:t-3) 0.7823 (3): – 0.6705 (3): **
+ market returns (t-1:t-3)
+ ∆ market liquidity (t-1:t-3)
Model (3) is again a benchmark and contains three lags of changes in
the number of issues as well as three lags of market returns. Model (4)
adds three lags of changes in market liquidity to Model (3). In Panel A,
the MSPE of Model (4) is slightly lower than the MSPE in Model (3) when
the crisis is included in the sample, though the difference is not statistically
significant. However, when the crisis is excluded, the MSPE of Model (4) is
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Table 3.6, continued
Panel B: In-sample estimation window of first 50% of sample period
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues
Model Independent variables with crisis without crisisMSPE DM-test MSPE DM-test
(1) average (∆ number of issues (1:t)) 1.2437 0.921
(2) ∆ market liquidity (t-1:t-3) 1.2200 (1): *** 0.8966 (1): ***
(3) ∆ number of issues (t-1:t-3) 0.8885 0.6663
+ market returns (t-1:t-3)
(4) ∆ number of issues (t-1:t-3) 0.8843 (3): – 0.6614 (3): –
+ market returns (t-1:t-3)
+ ∆ market liquidity (t-1:t-3)
Table 3.6, continued
Panel C: In-sample estimation window of first 70% of sample period
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues
Model Independent variables with crisis without crisisMSPE DM-test MSPE DM-test
(1) average (∆ number of issues (1:t)) 1.4155 1.1053
(2) ∆ market liquidity (t-1:t-3) 1.3905 (1): *** 1.0772 (1): ***
(3) ∆ number of issues (t-1:t-3) 1.0306 0.7865
+ market returns (t-1:t-3)
(4) ∆ number of issues (t-1:t-3) 1.0305 (3): – 0.7766 (3): *
+ market returns (t-1:t-3)
+ ∆ market liquidity (t-1:t-3)
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lower, and significantly so, indicating that including liquidity variables in the
forecasting model significantly improves forecasting performance. In Panel
B, the MSPE of Model (4) is slightly lower than the MSPE in Model (3)
regardless of whether the crisis is included. However, neither of the differences
are significant. In Panel C, the MSPE of Model (4) is marginally lower than
the MSPE in Model (3) when the crisis is included in the sample, though not
significantly so. However, when the crisis is excluded, the MSPE of Model
(4) is significantly lower, again indicating that adding the liquidity variables
improves forecasting performance.
Overall, these results suggest that including liquidity changes in the pre-
diction model improves out-of-sample prediction of changes in equity issuance.
The extent to which it improves performance depends on the in-sample size,
and on whether the crisis period is included in the analysis. Including liq-
uidity changes never significantly deteriorates forecasting performance. We
conclude that the liquidity effects uncovered in this paper are stable rather
than sample-specific and that liquidity may be useful in predicting issuance
activity.
In addition to the various robustness checks of our regressions we report
throughout the paper, we implement a battery of further robustness checks.
We report the results in Table 7. Model (1) of Table 7 reproduces our bench-
mark regression for comparison.
As we discussed, the variables in our regressions are first differenced and
demeaned. In Model (2), we do not demean the variables. The results are
almost identical. Further, throughout the paper, we estimate our regressions
using quarter fixed effects. These effects effectively remove common effects
across countries. We remove them to be conservative as these effects could
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Table 3.7. Robustness checks
This table reports coefficient estimates of panel regressions using quarterly data from
38 countries (NYSE and Nasdaq counted separately) over the period 1995Q1-2014Q4.
The dependent variable is the change in the number of equity issues (common stock
IPOs and SEOs from SDC). Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous,
and lagged changes in local market liquidity, local market returns, and lagged depen-
dent variables. Model (1) reproduces the benchmark regression Model (2) of Table
2. In Model (2), we do not demean the variables. In Model (3), we exclude the
quarter fixed effects. In Model (4), we exclude countries with an exchange merger
(Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, and Russia). In Model (5), we include data
from 1990 (instead of 1995) until 2014. In Model (6), we exclude the countries Aus-
tralia, Canada, India, and Japan, which have a large number of small issues. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix. All variables are demeaned (except those in Model
(2)) and standardized by country, so any coefficient can be interpreted as the effect in
standard deviations on the dependent variable of a one standard deviation shock to
the independent variable corresponding to that coefficient. Standard errors are clus-
tered by country and quarter. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated
by ***, **, and *.
Dependent variable: ∆ number of issues (t)
(1) full sample (2) no (3) no (4) no merged (5) 1990-2014 (6) no AUS,demeaning quarter FE exchanges CAN, IND, JPN
∆ market liquidity (t+1) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
∆ market liquidity (t) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07***
∆ market liquidity (t-1) 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08**
∆ market liquidity (t-2) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06***
∆ market liquidity (t-3) 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
∆ market liquidity (t-4) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
market returns (t+1) 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
market returns (t) 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10***
market returns (t-1) 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09***
market returns (t-2) 0.05* 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05* 0.07**
market returns (t-3) 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
market returns (t-4) 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06* 0.05* 0.03
∆ number of issues (t-1) -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.57***
∆ number of issues (t-2) -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.37***
∆ number of issues (t-3) -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.21***
Quarter fixed effects yes yes no yes yes yes
Nobservations 2,831 2,831 2,831 2,511 3,126 2,520
Ncountries 38 38 38 33 38 34
R2
within
(%) 26.9 26.8 31.2 26.7 26.0 26.8
R2 (%) 37.0 36.9 31.2 37.7 36.0 37.1
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be business cycle effects, for instance. However, these effects could also in
part represent common liquidity shocks, so that by removing them we only
have country-specific liquidity shocks. Model (3) estimates our benchmark
regression without the quarter fixed effects (we therefore include an intercept
but do not report its estimate in the table). We see that the sum of the
liquidity coefficients is now 0.31, the same as in Model (1). Since removing
the quarter fixed effects has little impact on the coefficients, a conclusion to
be drawn from the comparison of Model (3) to the benchmark model is that
country-specific liquidity shocks appear to be more important than common
liquidity shocks across countries. It is noteworthy that removing the quarter
fixed effects has more of an impact on the market return coefficients. In Model
(3), the sum of the coefficients on market returns is 0.29, which is substantially
lower than the sum of 0.38 in Model (1). Further, only two coefficients on
market returns are significant in Model (3) in contrast to four in Model (1).
As we discussed earlier, exchanges merge. When exchanges in the coun-
tries in our sample merge during our sample period, we include in our dataset
issuances from the exchanges that form the merged exchange. This choice
could raise issues in that before the merger we are using a liquidity measure
that is based on stocks trading on different markets that may have different
trading volume definitions, potentially hampering the comparability of the
Amihud liquidity measure across these markets. To examine the relevance of
this concern, we eliminate the countries in which the main market was the
result of a merger that took place during our sample period. As shown in
Model (4), if anything, doing so strengthens our results.
We collect data from 1990 but do not use it because for some countries it is
not clear that SDC collected data systematically before 1995. Nevertheless, if
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we use the longer sample period 1990-2014, Model (5) shows that our results
hold up.
To address the issue that our results could be overly influenced by specific
countries that have a large number of (tiny) equity issues (such as Australia,
Canada, India, and Japan), we investigate whether removing these countries
from the sample affects our results. It does not. In Model (6), we show that
removing Australia, Canada, India, and Japan from the sample hardly affects
the regression coefficients.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that equity issuance across the world is strongly re-
lated to equity market liquidity. Using changes in country level liquidity as an
explanatory variable for changes in equity issuance, we find that variation in
equity issuance is significantly related to contemporaneous and past liquidity
variation. We provide evidence that this relation between liquidity changes
and equity issuance changes cannot be attributed to liquidity serving as a
proxy for the general state of capital markets, aggregate economic activity,
asymmetric information or market sentiment. It is also not plausible that
the relation could be due to reverse-causation, since equity issuance typically
represents a small fraction of existing stock outstanding at the country level.
We show that issuance is more strongly related to liquidity in more finan-
cially developed markets, consistent with the view that firms are able to issue
equity more rapidly in these countries. In contrast, the relation between is-
suance and liquidity is weaker for loss making firms, which suggests that in
circumstances where issuing equity is a matter of greater urgency, liquidity
considerations play a smaller role. Furthermore, we show that accounting
for variation in liquidity not only improves explanatory power for issuance
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variation in-sample, but also enhances out-of-sample predictive power.
The economic magnitude of the relation between equity issuance changes
and liquidity changes is similar to that of the relation between equity issuance
changes and market returns. A one standard deviation shock to liquidity is
associated with a 0.14 standard deviation cumulative shock to equity issuance
over the subsequent three quarters, while a one standard deviation shock to
returns is associated with a 0.13 standard deviation shock to equity issuance
over the subsequent three quarters. For more financially developed markets,
the economic significance of the liquidity effects is again similar to that of
returns, and substantially greater than for less financially developed countries.
Overall, we interpret our findings to be supportive of the view that asset
market liquidity affects the cost of equity issuance and that firms take as-
set market liquidity into account when deciding whether and when to issue
equity.
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Chapter 5
Summary
This thesis aims to foster a greater understanding of primary market func-
tioning. It aims to be of use as an input in the continuous debate on how we
can best shape our financial markets to provide greater aﬄuence for society.
It contains three essays, included as separate chapters, that each focus on a
separate question related to raising capital via primary markets.
Chapter 2 deals with the market for initial public stock offerings. It shows
that stereotypes about industry performance are related to the opening per-
formance of newly issued stocks. It provides evidence that boundedly rational
demand side factors play a role in the market for new stocks, suggesting there
are inefficiencies in the way capital gets allocated. Better information provi-
sion may allow investors to form better expectations and to better determine
their demand, yielding a more optimal allocation of capital.
Chapter 3 deals with the general market for new equity. It shows that
firms issue more new stocks when markets become more liquid; i.e., when it
becomes easier to buy or sell large quantities of stocks without having to make
adjustments in the price. It uncovers one mechanism through which liquidity
on financial markets can affect firm financing decisions and with that can have
real economic consequences.
Chapter 4 deals with the market for new hybrid capital. It shows that
banks make riskier decisions after issuing Contingent Convertible bonds (Co-
Cos). CoCos were introduced after the financial crisis, to make the financial
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system safer for the taxpayers. A CoCo is a financial instrument that is a
bond when a bank is functioning normally, but is written off or converted
to equity when a bank becomes financially distressed. The results raise the
question whether there is a net overall benefit from issuing CoCos in terms
making the financial system safer.
Together these chapters provide greater understanding of primary mar-
ket functioning, and describe mechanisms that can be used as input in the
continuous debate on how we can best shape our financial markets.
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Chapter 6
Nederlandse samenvatting
Deze dissertatie heeft als doel het begrip van het functioneren van primaire
financiële markten te vergroten. De bevindingen kunnen gebruikt worden als
input in het voortdurende debat over hoe we het best onze financiële markten
kunnen (her)vormen ten behoeve van het vergroten van de welvaart in de
samenleving. Het bevat 3 verhandelingen, ingevoegd als aparte hoofdstukken,
die elk gefocust zijn op een aparte vraag gerelateerd aan het ophalen van
kapitaal op de primaire financiële markten.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt de markt voor beursintroducties van aandelen.
Het laat zien dat een stereotypisch beeld rondom prestaties van industrieën
gerelateerd is aan de prestaties op de eerste handelsdag van nieuw uitgegeven
aandelen. Het levert aanwijzingen op dat irrationele factoren aan de vraagz-
ijde een rol spelen in de markt voor beursintroducties, en suggereert dat
er inefficiënties zijn in de wijze waarop kapitaal wordt gealloceerd. Verbe-
terde informatieverstrekking zou investeerders in staat kunnen stellen om
betere verwachtingen te ontwikkelen met betrekking tot aandelenprestaties.
Daarmee zouden ze beter in staat kunnen zijn om hun vraag vast te stellen,
met als resultaat een meer optimale allocatie van kapitaal.
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de algemene markt voor nieuw aandelenkapitaal.
Het laat zien dat bedrijven meer aandelen uitgeven wanneer markten meer
liquide worden; i.e., wanneer het makkelijker wordt om grote hoeveelheden
aandelen te kopen of te verkopen zonder prijsconcessies te hoeven doen. Het
158 Chapter 6. Nederlandse samenvatting
onthult een van de mechanismen waardoor liquiditeit op financiële markten
de financieringsbeslissingen van bedrijven kan beïnvloeden, en daarmee reële
economische consequenties kan hebben.
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de markt voor nieuw hybride kapitaal. Het laat
zien dat banken risicovollere beslissingen nemen na het uitgeven van Contin-
gent Convertible bonds (CoCos). CoCos zijn geintroduceerd na de financiële
crisis om het financiële systeem veiliger te maken voor belastingbetalers. Een
CoCo is een financieel instrument dat een obligatie is wanneer een bank nor-
maal functioneert, maar afgeschreven wordt of geconverteerd wordt naar eigen
vermogen wanneer een bank in de financiële problemen komt. De bevindin-
gen van dit hoofdstuk doen de vraag rijzen of het uitgeven van CoCos het
financiële systeem daadwerkelijk veiliger maakt.
Gezamelijk geven deze hoofdstukken additioneel inzicht in het functioneren
van primaire financiële markten, en brengen ze mechanismen aan het licht
waar op ingehaakt kan worden in het continue debat over het (her)vormen
van onze financiële markten.
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